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UNDERSTANDING ETERNAL LIFE
Stephen Voss

The aim is to develop an account of eternal life consistent with the New
Testament and with contemporary insights concerning personal identity. Eternallife involves transformation within life and subsequent resurrection of the
body. John Hick's theory is inconsistent with the New Testament and, like
Derek Parfies reductionism, leaves no room for survival of death. David
Wiggin's work implies that survival requires that crucial parts of a human
being persist post-mortem. Humans are animals, and these parts are parts of
the body. So further development will require greater understanding of the
human body.

Suppose that you took seriously both the New Testament and contemporary
work on personal identity. What account of eternal life could you live with?
I raise the question neither to prove the truth of the answer that will emerge
here nor to reduce it to absurdity-regardless of how things might look. I
simply want to see more clearly the direction in which the above constraints
lead.
I begin by sketching the New Testament's teaching concerning eternal life.
I offer considerations in favor of a certain conception of the relation between
human beings and their bodies. Then I examine John Hick's attempt at an
account consistent with that teaching and that conception. I appropriate insights due to Derek Parfit in criticizing Hick, and insights due to David
Wiggins in developing an improved account. Finally I suggest some conceptual resources, drawn from revisionary metaphysicians like Origin and Spinoza, for the treatment of difficulties. Throughout, from several sides,
attention converges upon a specific metaphysical issue: the nature of the
human body.

I. New Testament Sources
Eternal life in the New Testament has two faces, It faces this present life:
it provides a renewed form of existence here and now. And it faces the future:
it provides a distinctive form of survival of death.
First, eternal life alters existence here and now. Jesus says that those who
believe have eternal life now, and that his own miraculous acts evince the
presence of the Kingdom of God.' Paul says that for believers death has
already begun to occur, and that believers are now capable of life in the
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Spirit.2 The best sign that a person possesses eternal life here and now is an
inclination toward agape. 3
Secondly, eternal life implies a distinctive form of survival of death. In a
central doctrinal passage, I Corinthians 15, Paul argues unequivocally that
the dead in Christ are to be raised. And mere survival is something less than
eternal life. For resurrection is granted both to the just and to the unjust; and
Jesus says that the unjust are to suffer "everlasting punishment," while the
just will enjoy "eternal life. "4
But eternal life is one phenomenon, not two. It touches the body both before
and after death. s Glorification following death is the culmination of a process
that starts before death. 6 Both pre-mortem and post-mortem aspects of eternal
life are consequences of a single divine activity.
Another fundamental feature of eternal life is that it involves resurrection
of the body rather than immortality of the soul. One of the most striking and
revealing aspects of I Corinthians 15 is the question that Paul anticipates and
then takes entirely seriously: "How are the dead raised? In what kind of
body?" He sees no point in discussing whether those who are raised will have
bodies. UnplatonicaIly, he takes that for granted. Oscar Cullman has argued
convincingly for this feature of eternal life, and I'll sketch and reinforce his
argument here. s
While the New Testament distinguishes the soul (psyche) or inner person
from the body (soma) or outer person, we must keep this distinction distinct
from that between the spirit (pneuma) and the flesh (sarx). The spirit is "the
power of creation," while the flesh is "the power of sin and death." Spirit
and flesh each seek to control both the inner and outer person. 9 For the New
Testament the enemy is sin and death, not the body. 10 Like eternal life, death
has two faces. For death not only ends the present life, it is the source of
spiritual darkness. That, speculates Cullman, is why death was fearsome to
Jesus. The body is to be redeemed, given life through the Spirit. \I When Jesus
was raised from the dead, the result was not a discarnate existence but a
resurrected body.12 Paul takes that primordial fact as a model for the
believer's state after death: it will involve the transformation and renewal of
the body, not its abandonment. 13
But now we need to deal with a difficulty which Donald Viney has raised
in correspondence: isn't the very idea of surviving death contradictory? "It
is odd to speak of death as if it were an event in life, even a very special
event. Death is not an event, not something one 'goes through.' It is the end
of life."
Death has two natural effects: (a) it brings an end to a person's existence;
(b) it blights the manifold possibilities of a person's life beforehand. But the
New Testament regards neither of these as essential to death; and that helps
justify the usage of theologians for whom neither (a) nor (b) is part of what
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the term "death" means. In fact, according to the passages cited in note 10,
death will be "destroyed," "abolished," so that the features mentioned in both
(a) and (b) will be significantly compromised: a person might undergo death
and still possess life. Our problem is just to understand the nature of death's
announced defeat. Let us return to that effort.
It is tempting to read Plato's soul-body dualism into the New Testament,
but Cullman argues that it is also incorrect. For Plato, death is not something
bad that happens to me; it is something bad that happens to my body. That
outlook is foreign to the New Testament: "only he who apprehends with the
first Christians the horror of death, who takes death seriously as death, can
comprehend the Easter exultation of the primitive community."14
It is not a matter of controversy that the New Testament speaks of resurrection of the body. I will assume that Cullman has convinced us as well that
it does not speak of immortality of the soul. Origen observed long ago that
the term asomaton-"incorporeal"-is unknown in the Scriptures}6 Indeed,
the New Testament teaches nothing of an incorporeal soul external to the
body, and it treats survival of death as a divine gift rather than an essential
attribute of human nature. IS Platonic dualism is not taught here.

II. Understanding the Dependence Fact
It is just as well that the New Testament speaks of resurrection of the body
and not immortality of the soul. For there is one simple body of facts which
I believe renders a wide range of dualistic views of the person extremely
implausible. I shall label them collectively the Dependence Fact. Dualism's
desperate position significantly limits the options for an account of eternal
life. I shall offer three ways to see how people look in the light of the
Dependence Fact, more in the spirit of Zen reminders than of rationally
compelling demonstrations that these dualistic views are false.
ZRI. If you are a Platonic soul, why does a sharp blow on your head
produce unconsciousness, and not just loss of control over your body?
ZR2. Plato suggests in the Phaedo that soul is to body as person is to suit
of clothes. But why do we accept person-suit dualism? One good reason is
that there are many personal operations unaffected by any damage to a
person's suit, and there are many personal dysfunctions that leave the suit
intact. If soul and body were really two distinct substances, then you would
expect at least some of the soul's operations to remain unaffected by any
harm to the body, and at least some dysfunctions of the soul not to be manifested in the body. But this is not the case.
ZR3. Perhaps a parable will give my point panache. Forget now the dusty
notions of Soul and Body, and think instead of Sarah and Bardolf, seen
through the eyes of a homely alien.
A vaguely hominoid creature is found wandering the fields. He is willing

6

Faith and Philosophy

to describe his own nature for us. "I contain two components, Sarah and
Bardolf. They are responsible for everything 1 do. You can see Bardolf but not
Sarah. Bardolf responds directly to external stimuli; Sarah responds only indirectly, via Bardolf. You can tell Sarah's responses only by watching Bardolf.
"Bardolf does lots of things on his own, without Sarah's help-things I've
heard you call 'merely physiological.' But I'm especially attached to certain
things that Sarah does alone or together with Bardolf, and since my name is
Osmond, I call them '0 operations.' Sarah is not only closer to me than breath
itself; her nature is entirely different than Bardolf's. It's clear to me that if
Sarah does anything on her own it counts as an 0 operation."
The scientists studying Osmond form two camps. The tough-minded ones
believe Sarah does no work at all, and that every 0 operation is done by
Bardolf alone. The tender-minded ones take Osmond at his word. The scientists try to settle their dispute by questioning Osmond further. Here's all they
can get from him.
"I can tell whether many 0 operations are going on without observing
Bardolf in the way you must. I have a special set of organs that let me look
within myself, and they yield information about my 0 operations that pretty
much squares with your own. I can tell that some large shadowy mass within
me is at work producing-at least helping to produce-those operations. I've
always assumed that that mass was Sarah, but the view is so hazy that for all
I can tell it's just part of Bardolf."
The two camps of scientists remain far apart. Each camp can easily interpret
Osmond's latest deliverance consistently with its own view. In desperation
they call in a philosopher-you. They summarize their experimental findings
for you:
Fl. Sometimes the 0 operations break down in different ways. Any such
breakdown can be traced back to something that has gone wrong within
Bardolf.
F2. We can induce any known type of breakdown in an 0 operation by
damaging Bardolf in just the right way.
Deep in thought, you assume your armchair. At length you write your
conclusions.
Cl. If Sarah does help produce any of Osmond's 0 operations, there is a
thorough-going correlation between Sarah's and Bardolf's work in producing it.
For each 0 operation, there is a characteristic piece of work that Bardolf does;
on the other hand, everything Sarah does duplicates something Bardolf does.
C2. None of the scientists who accept Osmond's story can explain that
correlation.
C3. Therefore Sarah plays no part in producing Osmond's 0 operations.
Bardolf is responsible for them all.
C4. In fact, there's no reason to believe that Sarah even exists.
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You tell the scientists-and Osmond. Osmond feels bereft. Sarah is gone. Osmond must allow Bardolf to take her place, and acknowledge that it is just Bardolf
who does everything he thought Sarah did or the two of them did together.
Osmond's 0 operations remain, as magical as ever. Perhaps a clearer understanding of them is now possible. An interesting and intimate correlation
indeed exists-not between Sarah's work and Bardolf's, but between some
of Bardolf's work and Osmond's 0 operations. How does Bardolf enable
Osmond to carry out his 0 operations? That question looms larger than it could
have before your work-for you, for Osmond, for the readers of this paper.
The Dependence Fact which ZRI-ZR3 signal threatens two broadly dualistic intuitions. In characterizing them I shall make explicit two of my presuppositions in this paper: that a person is a substance, and that a human body
is a substance. At the very end of the paper we shall discover reason to
question the presumption that a person's body is a substance.
First let "Sarah" in the parable remind you of the Soul. Given the notions of
person and body, the simplest way to capture the notion that I need here is this.
Definition. The soul is the unique substance S that satisfies these three conditions.
(i) S is the apparatus, or a significant part of it, that the person uses to carry

out his or her mental and spiritual operations, or a significant portion
of them.
(ii) Neither S nor any part of S is the body or any part of the body.
(iii) The person is either S or the compound of S and the body.

Of course there are many alternative conceptions of the soul that are useful
in other contexts.
Think of Osmond's 0 operations as a human being's mental and spiritual
operations, and think of Sarah as the soul and Bardolf as the body. FI, F2,
Cl, and C2 hold; and C3 and C4 now have immediate application. The soul
plays no part in producing any of a person's mental operations. The only
apparatus internal to the person that must do any work is apparatus internal
to the body, particularly the brain and its peripheral organs. Therefore there
is no reason to believe that the soul exists.
But the parable of Osmond has further application. Thinkers from Marcus
Aurelius to Raymond Moody have thought that the body contains a "subtle
body" or "astral body" or "spiritual body" -an unfamiliar bodily part that
serves as a kind of double of the familiar ("gross") body, superimposed on
it, perhaps even containing (subtle) duplicates of all the familiar (gross)
bodily parts. 17 So this time let "Sarah" remind you of the Subtle Body.
Definition. The subtle body is the unique substance S such that the body is
the compound of S and the gross body.

The experimental information about the human body that makes FI and F2
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ring true is actually information about the gross body, for it consists of just
those parts of the human body that have turned out to be easily accessible to
scientists. So the subtle body and the soul are equally vulnerable to ZR3,
and C3 and C4 apply to it too. The subtle body plays no part in producing
any of a person's mental operations, and there is no reason to believe that
it exists.
This attack upon the soul and the subtle body is no proof of incoherence,
or even of inconsistency with any facts adduced. The inference within the
parable from Cl and C2 to C3 is the crucial one, and it is not demonstrative.
If you find the implications drawn below too repugnant, you might wish to
seek grounds for blocking that inference. But the immediate upshots of the
Dependence Fact are these.
C5. Neither soul nor subtle body exists.
C6. Every part of the gross human body is a part of the person, and every
part of the person is a part of the gross body.
C7. The only apparatus a person possesses for carrying out his or her mental
operations is the gross human body.
We have already been led to C5. C6 is the sensible conclusion to draw from
C5; and C6 in turn entails both C5 and C7. Such a thorough attack upon
dualist intuitions certainly complicates any attempt at an account of eternal
life. How can we even contemplate the possibility that the person is capable
of surviving death?

III. The Reductionist Gambit
At just this point John Hick's theory recommends itself. IS Hick regards a
person, not as a ghost in a machine, but as an "empirical self" whose mental
side is a matter of "behavior and behavioral dispositions. "19
Hick tells three parables of his own. In the one that counts, Mr. X dies, and
a "replica" of him appears in a world spatially distinct from our own, a
"replica" that apparently possesses Mr. X's memories, and is "physically and
psychologically indistinguishable" from him.20 In spite of the utter lack of spatiotemporal continuity between Mr. X and his "replica," and in spite of their failure
to contain any components in common, Hick argues that sufficient evidence
could accumulate to justify the claim that the "replica" is no mere replica, but
is identical with Mr. X: that is, he and Mr. X are one and the same man.
Nevertheless, Hick's theory is incompatible with the New Testament teaching that the "spiritual body" -the soma pneumatikon-is a transformation of
the "natural body" -the soma pseukikon. Notice the function of the pronouns
in these texts: "The seed you sow does not come to life unless it has first
died." "What is sown in the earth as a perishable thing is raised imperishable.
Sown in humiliation, it is raised in glory; sown in weakness, it is raised in
power; sown as an animal body, it is raised as a spiritual body. "21 According
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to all these texts and more, the natural body is transformed into, not replaced
by, the spiritual body.
Further evidence appears in the texts describing Jesus's resurrection. First
Jesus's followers discover an astounding fact: his body-unlike Mr. X's-is
not in the tomb. Then an angel tells them two more facts: he is not here; he
is risen. 22 The two claims that he is not here and that he is risen are meant to
help explain the fact that his body is not here. The explanation succeeds only
if it is understood that the body that is no longer here in the tomb has been
transformed into the body he possesses now that he is risen.
You may find this evidence weaker. That depends on where you think Paul's
ana!ogy between Jesus's resurrection and that of other people finally breaks
down. Hick, for one, has said in correspondence, "my own 'replica' theory
concerned the general resurrection, not the resurrection of Jesus, which I take
to have been different and unique in character."
But is Hick's theory philosophically tenable? We are forced to raise this
question when we address a further discrepancy between Hick's theory and
the New Testament. Mr. X and his "replica" are very much alike, but the
spiritual body is supposed to be very different from the natural body. Well,
then, why not simply allow Mr. X's "replica" to differ significantly from the
original Mr. X? The answer is that Hick is philosophically constrained to
build physical and psychological similarity into Mr. X's "replica":
The reason for postulating full initial bodily similarity between the resurrected person and the pre-resurrection person is to preserve a personal identity
which we are supposing to be wholly bound up with the body. If the person is
an indissoluble psycho-physical unity, it would seem that he must begin his
resurrection life as identically the person who has just died, even though he may
then proceed to undergo changes which are not possible in our present world. 23

Given the discontinuities between Mr. X and his "replica," only such thorough similarities could tip the balance in favor of the thesis that the "replica"
just is Mr. X.
But this picture of a balance of the evidence begins to reveal the philosophical weakness of the theory. Hick holds that the question whether the "replica"
is identical with Mr. X should be settled by "what we would say" about the
identity of "replicas" in his similar preliminary parables, and by what Mr.
X's "replica" himself "would say" about his own identity within the present
parable. 24
But that sort of approach cannot settle the matter. There are two ways to
see this. (a) According to Hick, we must base our judgment about the "replica" upon a certain sufficiency of evidence. But what is it evidence/or? What
fact constitutes the supposed identity of Mr. X and his "replica"? It cannot
simply be the similarities and the apparent memories, for they constitute the
evidence. If they are evidence for some identity-fact, that fact is another fact.
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(b) We can corne at the same point from a different direction. What is it in
the idea of being the same human being that makes the similarities between
Mr. X and his "replica" weightier evidence than the discontinuities between
them? How are we to make the scales accurate? An account of survival that
can answer this question is better off than one that cannot.
It emerges that there really is no fact that the "replica" is identical with
Mr. X. In one of his preliminary parables Hick says that the question of
identity "would presumably be a matter for decision. "25 In the case of Mr. X,
"we should be obliged to modify our concept of 'same person"'; the modification is an improvement because the original and the "replica" "have everything in common that they could possibly have, given that they exist
successively in different spaces. "26 But-to press point (b)-perhaps the idea
of being the same human being does not allow for that "given" to be surmounted. To press point (a), if the only facts we can point to are facts about
the similarities and the discontinuities between the original and the "replica,"
it/ollows that there is no further fact about whether the "replica" is or is not
identical with Mr. X.
Hick's theory may be assimilated to the one Derek Parfit presents in Reasons and Persons. 21 Parfit defends a kind of reductionism about personal
identity: he says that a person's identity over time just consists in certain
more particular facts, facts about physical and psychological similarities and
continuities; and that these facts do not presuppose the person's identity over
time-or for that matter even the very existence of a person. The fact that
persons exist, or the fact that persons persist over time, has for Parfit no
metaphysical bite to it: we could give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist or persist. 28
Parfit argues convincingly that any theorist who answers questions of identity by a "decision" or a "stipulation" to extend the usual criteria does not
differ in any interesting way from a reductionist. In correspondence, Hick
seems to agree. If we want to know the truth about a person's persistence
after we learn the facts about similarity and continuity, it doesn't matter
whether we're told "There is no such truth" or "I hereby decide to call this
the truth rather than that. "29
A reductionist theory which denies that there are any special facts about
personal identity is not consistent with Paul's concern as he launches into the
central passage: "For if the dead are not raised, it follows that Christ was not
raised; and if Christ was not raised, your faith has nothing in it and you are
still in your old state of sin .... If it is for this life only that Christ has given
us hope, we of all men are most to be pitied." "If the dead are never raised
to life, 'let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die. '''30
One theological merit of Parfit's book is that it presents a clear and powerful alternative to the New Testament teaching about eternal life. Parfit's
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own account is closer to Buddhist teaching, and it is natural for him to
conclude his book with texts like these:
Buddha has spoken thus: '0 Brethren, actions do exist, and also their consequences, but the person that acts does not. There is no one to cast away this
set of elements and no one to assume a new set of them. There exists no
Individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements.'
The mental and the material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found.
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll,
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticksY

To make a decision about Mr. X's "replica" is to rely on Buddhist rather than
Christian anthropology. The latter takes personal identity seriously. To be
sure, there is religious value for non-Buddhists in some of the antiegocentric
corollaries of reductionism; some of them are also corollaries of the Christian
doctrine of agape. But while a New Testament interpreter might turn in
extremis to reductionism, at this stage the proposal to accept a decision about
the "replica" is a counsel of defeat. Let us continue to suppose that there is
a truth to be found, and try to find it.
But let us focus on Mr. X instead of his "replica." Imagine that Mr. X is a
Corinthian who has written an urgent letter to Paul, but that Hick intercepts
it and writes Mr. X an epistle of his own. Mr. X breaks the seal on Hick's
epistle with trembling hands, and scans the page. At the moment of death, he
reads, his body will be laid to rest, and an extremely similar "replica" will
appear elsewhere-claiming to remember living Mr. X's life.
Mr. X's response is easy to imagine: "What does all that have to do with me?
Nothing of me will be present in my 'replica' -no Platonic soul, no bit of bodily
stuff-so none of my characteristics will be preserved in the 'replica's' bodily
condition or psychological states or apparent memories." Novelists sometimes
write about real people, giving the lie to their disclaimer "any resemblance
between my characters and real people is purely coincidental"; and Mr. X now
mordantly reflects that Hick's epistle has reversed the procedure: it deals with a
person who does not now exist, and the resemblance between that person and
Mr. X really is purely coincidental-or, worse, a monstrous cosmic joke. Mr. X
vacillates between "selfless" benevolence toward his "replica" and defiant conviction that even his "replica" must eventually come to take those apparent
memories a little more philosophically. After all, the point that strikes Mr. X
now is one his "replica" can also come to appreciate.
The "replica," then, remains a mere replica. Hick's parable is a denial
of survival, not a device to render it intelligible. We have only to ask Mr.
X. His intuitions are absolutely sound, whether or not he can defend them
philosophically.32
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IV. Criteria of Persistence for Human Beings
Under what conditions might Mr. X survive death? More generally, under
what conditions does Mr. X persist from one moment to the next? We need
better standards for answering these questions. The best I know of are the
Aristotelian standards that David Wiggins has developed. I refer the reader
to his extraordinary book Sameness and Substance 33 for a defense of them.
Here I shall merely sketch them and appropriate what seems right for my own
purposes.
A predicate F supplies a criterion of persistence, or identity over time, for
a natural thing y just in case it adequately answers the Aristotelian question
"What is y?" F must be a sortal predicate. F must also be a natural kind
predicate: it may be clear enough through ostension and the like to be quite
usable, but its sense can be expected to be nomologically laden and learnable
gradually and scientifically rather than armchair analytically. Roughly, F will
be the most narrow or specific sortal, natural kind predicate such that we
cannot conceive y not to instantiate F. For, on the one hand, it must be de re
necessary that y instantiate F, because we wish to exclude the possibility that
y should cease to be, or should never have been, characterizable by F. On the
other hand, F should be the most specific such predicate, because it will then
be the most informative about the conditions under which y persists. 34
When y is you or I or Mr. X, the appropriate F is "human being," or "animal
of the species homo sapiens." This predicate provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the persistence of any y it is true of. For it specifies the
nature of the continuity (Wiggins's phrase is "the manner of coincidence") that
must be present between y and z in order for z to be the same human being as y.
A basic fact about the variety of continuity that must hold between y and
z, if z is to be the same human being as y, is that "human being" entails
"person" and that "person" in turn is heavily laden with the psychological.
Wiggins suggests this definition of "person."
Perhaps x is a person if and only if x is an animal falling under the extension
of a [natural] kind whose typical members perceive, feel, remember, imagine,
desire, make projects, move themselves at will, speak, carry out projects,
acquire a character as they age, are happy or miserable, are susceptible to
concern for members of their own or like species ... [note carefully these and
subsequent dots-DW], conceive of themselves as perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making projects, speaking ... , have, and conceive of themselves as having, a past accessible to experience-memory and
a future accessible in intention ... , etc. 35

Wiggins regards "person" as a biological predicate- "animal that is ..... -re"stricted by a non-biological functional or "systemic" component. But the
thesis that all persons are animals runs afoul of New Testament references to
the likes of angels, demons, and divine persons. I propose that we help
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ourselves to the merits of the quoted passage by taking it as the schema of a
definition of "person that is an animal," or "biological person."
The alteration is peripheral here, for in any case it is "human being" that
provides our own persistence conditions, and on either reading the quoted
passage makes explicit part of the sense of "human being" and thereby part
of what it is for y and z to be continuous in the way that "human being"
provides for. The specific natural kind predicate that determines the principle
of identity over time for you and me is not "person" but "human-person"-or
simply "human being." Our persistence conditions are specified, not by a
criterion of personal identity, but by a criterion of human identity.
Wiggins places the salutary dots in his account to signal the fact that the
concept person (and therefore the concept human being) is not yet fully
clear to US. 36 A human person is necessarily an animal. It is therefore
sensible to think that further discoveries about the concept human must
wait upon biology.
But the New Testament suggests its own supplemental biology, its own
enhancement of the familiar accounts of the nature of life. A human person
is essentially an animal capable of gaining eternal life: an animal that is
capable of becoming, or has already begun to become, a "spiritual person,"
inclined to exhibit agape toward God and neighbor. So we can fill in some
of those dots, with a phrase like "are capable of gaining eternal life, including
its agapic manifestations." The account begins to fuse the two aspects of
eternal life noted initially into the seamless whole which the New Testament
takes them to constitute.

V. Coming to Terms with Plato
In this section we develop a crucial necessary condition for the persistence
of human beings, and in the end a set of conditions that are jointly sufficient.
A human being is essentially a certain kind of animal with a certain range of
capacities and dispositions. Now how does this characterization help specify
the manner in which a human being y must be continuous with z in order for
y to have persisted as z? Again, Wiggins:
A disposition is the sort of thing which can rest latent, be revived and refreshed, and is at the disposal of its owner to use under all sorts of different
circumstances or not to use. It is impossible to conceive of memory causality
by analogy with action at a distance as a transaction over a matterless gap
between the external world at one time and a mind at a later time. The more
one tries to conceive of such a thing the less it can satisfy himY

Wiggins is surely right to think that the systemic component in a person's
makeup must be grounded in the stuff composing the person. It is just at this
point that we must break decisively with Hick, and make the accommodation
with Plato that we have suspected all along would be needed in any account
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of survival. It is a merit of the accommodation we shall urge that it flows
from an attempt to answer the more general question of the variety of continuity that a human being must retain during any change in order to persist.
Plato held that one crucial part of the person by its very nature made
possible the rationality essential to personhood. And he held that if the person
is to persist then just that part of the person must also persist. Plato thought
wrongly that the part in question was not a part of the body-perhaps it was
the soul, perhaps the rational soul or the rational part of the soul. I think Plato
was right on the central point. So I shaH label it the Platonic Principle: 38
If a human being y persists over a period of time then so must that part of
y-whatever it turns out to be in the case o/human beings-that is nomologically
required for there to be a human being-that is, a human animal with the
attributes essential to personhood. And that entails that from one moment
to the next in y's career some of the same stuff must help constitute y.

I shaH use the Latin term "anima" to refer to that part.
Definition. The anima is the part, or improper part, or collection of parts, of
the human being whose existence is nomologically necessary for the existence of the human being.

The Platonic Principle entails that if the laws of nature dictate that human
beings must possess a certain part, then a necessary condition for the persistence of a human being over a stretch of time is the persistence of that very
part, and therefore the presence from one moment to the next of some of the
same constituent matter or stuff.
Two kinds of knowledge are called for if we wish to apply the Platonic
Principle to find definite necessary conditions for the persistence of human
beings: first, which properties in humans are essential to personhood; secondly, which parts of humans are, by natural necessity, required for a human
to possess those properties. The line of thought leading from Hick through
Wiggins has helped answer the first question. And a natural line of thought
leading from the Dependence Fact requires that any answer to the second
question mention only parts of the (gross) body. It is only an account of
human personhood with this sort of detailed structure that can ground Hick's
project of balancing similarities against discontinuities, and hedge it against
resolution by fiat.
The theory of the anima flows not only from reflection on the persistence
conditions of human beings, but also from the attempt to interpret the New
Testament. In particular, it provides a natural way to read I Corinthians
15:36-45 and II Corinthians 5: 1-5 as teaching a single coherent doctrine.
The first of these passages likens the bodies of the dead who are to be raised
to plants whose grains fall into the ground. In one sense, described in verses
42-44, "what is sown in the earth" is "an animal body," which "is raised as a

UNDERSTANDING ETERNAL LIFE

15

spiritual body." In another sense, however, described in verses 36-38, "the
seed you sow" is the anima, the essential nucleus of the animal body. It will
be in turn a part of the body in which the dead are raised; on that account
"what you sow is not the body that shall be; ... God clothes it with the body
of his choice."
According to the second passage, "we yearn to have our heavenly habitation put on over" "the earthly frame that houses us today," "in the hope that,
being thus clothed, we should not find ourselves naked." What we hope to
save from nakedness is again the anima-in the form of which we should
survive if no non-essential parts were granted us. Since this is the part that
is essential to our persistence, its own persistence enables us first to be housed
by one frame and then clothed by another habitation.
In both passages, the anima is that part of the body whose "naked" state is
forestalled by the divine act of "clothing." The resulting "spiritual body" or
"heavenly habitation" possesses both new components and new properties.
The body is raised imperishable, in glory, in power; our mortal part is absorbed into life immortal.
How serious is this accommodation with Platonism? It entails two characteristic Platonic doctrines.
Pl. The anima can, in principle, persist when nothing else of the person
remains, and preserve the person thereby.39
P2. The anima is the seat of psychological continuity within the person; it
earns the title of anima by housing the dispositions essential to personhood.
But the Platonic Principle does not entail certain other Platonic doctrines.
We may still accept the following reasonable monistic doctrines.
MI. The anima is not the unique locus of spiritual growth or maturity. Dante
shows in the Inferno that the inner person is subject to failings far more serious
than those, like lust or gluttony, that are embodied in more peripheral, metaphysically inessential parts of the body. We have already noticed that eternal life
suffuses the whole body-the peripheral as well as the nuclear. Even Augustine
allows that "as when the spirit serves the flesh, it is fitly called carnal, so,
when the flesh serves the spirit, it will justly be called spiritual."4o
M2. The person is more than the anima, and the anima is only a part of the
person. And the rest of the body is not the person's clothing, instrument,
baggage; according to C6, every part of the body is a part of the person. Let
me make that point in paradoxical style: even if there comes a moment when
nothing is left of the person but the naked anima, the person remains nonidentical with it. That follows by Leibniz's Law from the fact that the person
but not the anima once had a left ear as a part.
M3. The anima is a part of the body. So even the amended Platonism
wherein the person is the compound of anima and body is false, just as it is
false that a person is a compound of brain and body.
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Three conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient for a human being to
survive death through eternal life. We could have learned them, respectively,
from Wiggins, Hick, and Plato.
S 1. A human being is essentially an animal with a body; therefore an animal
with a body must persist. (That is no obstacle to resurrection or glorification.
Biology's present account of the sense of "animal" is far from complete, and
biology may be revealed as well as natural.)
S2. A human being essentially has the attributes of personhood, including
the possibilities of agape; therefore a being with those attributes must
persist. (Survival by eternal life requires the realization of some of those
possibilities.)
If conditions S 1 and S2 are satisfied by the same being, then some human
being exists, but that is not yet to say that the same human being persists.
S3. That part of the person must persist that grounds those essential attributes, and it must continue to do the grounding. When the anima meets this
condition, it guarantees that the same animal, and the same subject of personal
attributes, has survived; in other words, it guarantees that the same person
has survived. (Perhaps everyone but Augustine 41 agrees that some of a
human's parts are always survival-inessential; nail clipping and even severe
amputation are losses we can survive, even at the moment of death. But there
are some parts that we cannot live without. The brain is a sensible place to
start looking, though even at this stage even of secular science it is clear that
this guess is much too rough.)

VI. Familiar Problems, Unfamiliar Resources
It is condition S3 that finally arouses old doubts about the doctrine of
eternal life. For the Dependence Fact suggests that I possess only gross bodily
parts. And "certain facts about the present age"42 seem to entail that at death all
my familiar bodily parts cease to exist or to support my essential attributes:
apparently all of those parts begin to disintegrate, and apparently none of them
is lifted bodily for use elsewhere. Then how could S3 possibly be satisfied?
According to a familiar story, at some time after death God miraculously
reintegrates some or all of my bodily parts, so that they come to ground my
personal attributes as they once did. But the old objections become more serious
if, lacking a soul or the like, I have no other parts but these. The first problem
is that long before reintegration I evidently lose the dispositions essential to
personhood, and thus existence itself. Some New Testament passages suggest
something like sleep during this period, while others suggest a more robust
consciousness. 43 But doctrinal tinkering is no help here, since any analogue of
sleep still requires the preservation of the dispositions essential to personhood.
The second problem is that it seems that the result of this sort of miracle
would not be my own restoration to new life, but the creation of a new person
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from the remains of myoId parts. Peter van Inwagen argues persuasively that
"if a man should be totally destroyed, then it is very hard to see how any man
who comes into existence thereafter could be the same man," for a man
persists only if his components occupy their positions relative to one another
as a result of that man's biological processes, and that is not the case here. 44
The two problems are not distinct. The role of the second problem is just to
accent the seriousness of the first problem. Enhanced clarity about my persistence conditions has served only to reveal more starkly that the disintegration of
the only parts I have is the ultimate threat to my continued existence.
I shall conclude by calling attention to two kinds of resources for meeting
these serious problems. I mention them not in order to argue that they solve
the problems, but in order to point out the particular area where further work
must be done. Nevertheless, it counts a great deal that they look promising
and not desperate.
The resources I am about to sketch differ over the relation they intimate
between the human corpse and the resurrection body: to use a culinary figure,
the first regards the corpse as fixings; the second, as leftovers. According to
the first, disintegration may not be all that threatening; according to the
second, what looks to you and me like disintegration may not be.
The first resource is the Church Fathers, and Origen in particular. The
Fathers are promising because their access to the New Testament is relatively
uncluttered, and because they are sometimes aware of the dangers in uncritical assimilation of Athens (including Plato) to Jerusalem. 4s They all accept
liberal doses of soul-body dualism, but Origen holds that only God can exist
incorporeally,46 thereby advancing a surprising distance toward C3, though
not C4-C7. He sees the need to tackle problems of the kind I have just
sketched, for he accepts those "facts about the present age": at death the body
begins to be dissolved, reduced to dust and ashes. 47 How then can he speak
of survival, when on his own account that would require bodily persistence?
Origen maintains that after death, during the process of bodily dissolution,
the person retains a certain ratio 48 or logos spermatos: 49 that is, a "power" or
"germ" or "reason" or "principle" (as various translators have it) which, by
the Word of God, will enable the restoration of the body's parts, and endow
the body with incorruption and immortality. The ratio is not to be conceived
as a substance; it is neither soul nor subtle body nor anima. Instead, it is a
power which the person possesses post-mortem. Here Origen explicitly draws
upon the pregnant Pauline figure of the grain that falls into the ground, dies,
and then brings forth a new plant. He writes that the ratio raises up our bodies
"as the power which is in the grain of wheat, after its corruption and death,
repairs and restores the grain into a body having stalk and ear. "SO
This theoretical notion, and the analogy of the grain which led Origen to
it, may contain valuable resources for confronting the old problems. Perhaps
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the ratio is a power a person gains pre-mortem along with eternal life, and
retains even as his or her parts disintegrate. While disintegration is not to be
taken lightly, the conceptual\y crucial matter is not contiguity of bodily parts,
but retention of the dispositions essential to personhood. If Origen is right,
dissolution does not entail destruction. Perhaps the scattered conglomerate
can retain, with supernatural aid in the form of the ratio, the dispositions
essential to personhood.
It would certainly help to have some idea how someone could persist in
the face of disintegration. There are natural analogues that get us started: the
watch that persists, and retains its essential powers, even though scattered
into tiny bits in the jeweler's repair shop. With a divinely bestowed ratio, it
might still tick away, and keep ghostly but accurate time! Then the Old
Testament vision of the nation of Israel provides a further lure to philosophical imagination: Israel remains God's chosen people even when the Diaspora
is scattered to the four winds.
The hand of Yahweh was on me; he carried me away by the spirit of Yahweh
and set me down in the middle of the valley, a valley full of bones. He made
me walk up and down and all around among them. There were vast quantities
of these bones on the floor of the valley; and they were completely dry. He
said to me, 'Son of man, can these bones live?' I said, 'You know, Lord
Yahweh.' He said, 'Prophesy over these bones. Say, "Dry bones, hear the
word of Yahweh. The Lord Yahweh says this to these bones: I am now going
to make breath enter you, and you will live. I shall put sinews on you, I shall
make flesh grow on you, I shall cover you with skin and give you breath,
and you will live; and you will know that I am yahweh ... · I prophesied as I
had been ordered. While I was prophesying, there was a noise, a clattering
sound; it was the bones coming together. And as I looked, they were covered
with sinews; flesh was growing on them and skin was covering them, yet
there was no breath in them. He said to me, 'Prophesy to the breath; prophesy,
son of man. Say to the breath, "The Lord Yahweh says this: Come from the
four winds, breath, breathe on these dead, so that they come to life!'" I
prophesied as he had ordered me, and the breath entered them; they came to
life and stood up on their feet, a great, an immense army.SI

The notion of the ratio is another step in the direction of Platonism. It may
fall afoul of the Dependence Fact. It may conflict with the commonsense
view that our psychological features supervene upon the condition of the stuff
we are made of.S2 Such questions need to be considered. But I shall not pursue
them here. I shall only call attention to the particular way in which this
theoretical proposal compels us to reconsider the nature of the body.
The second resource is a type of revisionary metaphysics. The type needed
is seen most easily by examining this reformulation of one of the paper's
central arguments.
Premise 1. If the gross body is a substance and the Dependence Fact holds
then all my parts are parts of the gross body.
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Premise 2. The Dependence Fact holds.
Premise 3. The gross body is a substance.
Conclusion. All my parts are parts of the gross body.

The argument is valid, the first two premises are reasonable, and the problems
might be easier to solve if we could deny the conclusion. So perhaps a
metaphysics that denies Premise 3 is worth considering. I have suggested that
the inference from Cl and C2 and C3 is the weakest link in my parable's
argument. Its greatest weakness may lie in the possibility that the familiar
gross body is not a substance.
Consider seventeenth-century revisionary metaphysics. Many philosophers
found the sticking point in Descartes's philosophy to be his doctrine of two
miraculously correlated substances. Spinoza found the natural remedy in a
denial that the body is a substance in its own right. Instead it was a "mode"
of some further substance. Cartesians like Spinoza found it more intelligible
that two series of occurrences within two modes of a single substance should
be correlated than that two series of occurrences within two substances should
be correlated. They viewed the Dependence Fact as naturally more hospitable
to double-aspect theories than to double-substance theories of the human
-animal. Does their viewpoint finally provide a way to understand Cl?
Or consider Indian metaphysics, according to which the human body is an
instance of maya-the appearance that the underlying reality presents to us,
partly revelatory, partly illusory. This conception makes room for the position
that when as it seems to us the body disintegrates, the reality of which it is
the appearance persists.
But perhaps the categories of substance and mode will be most useful. So
drop the presumption that the human body is a substance, and suppose that
the gross body is a mode of the human being. And suppose that the human
being possesses at least one mode distinct from it, so subtle as to be scientifically inaccessible. Drop the language of body entirely, and speak of gross
and subtle modes of the person. Suppose that a human being's mental operations are manifested in parallel changes within these two modes.
The anima remains by definition the survival-essential part of the human
being. It too has gross and subtle modifications. Suppose that the anima
persists if and only if its owner's subtle mode functions properly. Suppose
finally that the subtle mode may remain a characteristic of a human being
even if the gross mode ceases to do so.
On such a theory, survival of what we used to call the dissolution of the
body becomes conceivable, for this is not the destruction of a substance but
only the cessation of a mode of functioning not essential to the anima or the
human being. Such theories are revisionary in a wholesale manner, and they
may well entail revisions we should be unwilling to make. Again I shall not
pursue these questions here.
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Revisionary proposals like those involving the concepts of ratio or mode
require closer examination of the nature of the human body. Apart from such
proposals, hopes for survival are intimately bound up with the destiny of the
familiar human body. For then beyond the body there is nothing of the person.
But then what does the New Testament, together with its Old Testament
roots, teach about the human body? What understanding can philosophy offer
of its nature? The varied strands of this inquiry into eternal life all converge
upon questions about the nature of the human body.s3
La Petite Maison
Chateau de Thuellin
Veyrins, France 38630
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